In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner or payoff of the game. Such games are central in formal verification since they model the interaction between a non-terminating system and its environment. We study bidding games in which the players bid for the right to move the token. Two bidding rules have been defined. In Richman bidding, in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, and the higher bidder moves the token and pays the other player. Poorman bidding is similar except that the winner of the bidding pays the "bank" rather than the other player. While poorman reachability games have been studied before, we present, for the first time, results on infinite-duration poorman games. A central quantity in these games is the ratio between the two players' initial budgets. The questions we study concern a necessary and sufficient ratio with which a player can achieve a goal. For reachability objectives, such threshold ratios are known to exist for both bidding rules. We show that the properties of poorman reachability games extend to complex qualitative objectives such as parity, similarly to the Richman case. Our most interesting results concern quantitative poorman games, namely poorman mean-payoff games, where we construct optimal strategies depending on the initial ratio, by showing a connection with random-turn based games. The connection in itself is interesting, because it does not hold for reachability poorman games. We also solve the complexity problems that arise in poorman bidding games.
Introduction
Two-player infinite-duration games on graphs are a central class of games in formal verification [3] and have deep connections to foundations of logic [34] . They are used to model the interaction between a system and its environment, and the problem of synthesizing a correct system then reduces to finding a winning strategy in a graph game [32] . Theoretically, they have been widely studied. For example, the problem of deciding the winner in a parity game is a rare problem that is in NP and coNP [21] , not known to be in P, and for which a quasi-polynomial algorithm was only recently discovered [10] .
A graph game proceeds by placing a token on a vertex in the graph, which the players move throughout the graph to produce an infinite path ("play") π. The game is zero-sum and π determines the winner or payoff. Two ways to classify graph games are according to the type of objectives of the players, and according to the mode of moving the token. For example, in reachability games, the objective of Player 1 is to reach a designated vertex t, and the objective of Player 2 is to avoid t. An infinite play π is winning for Player 1 iff it visits t. The simplest mode of moving is turn based: the vertices are partitioned between the two players and whenever the token reaches a vertex that is controlled by a player, he decides how to move the token.
We study a new mode of moving in infinite-duration games, which is called bidding, and in which the players bid for the right to move the token. The bidding mode of moving was introduced in [26, 27] his target in the uniform game RTB 0.5 (G) from a vertex v equals 1 − Th(v) in G. For poorman reachability games, no such probabilistic connection is known. Moreover, such a connection is unlikely to exist since unlike in the Richman case, there are finite poorman games with irrational threshold ratios. The lack of a probabilistic connection makes poorman games technically more complicated.
More interesting, from the synthesis and logic perspective, are infinite winning conditions, but they have only been studied in the Richman setting previously [5] . We show, for the first time, existence of threshold ratios in qualitative poorman games with infinite winning conditions such as parity. The proof technique is similar to the one for Richman bidding: we show a linear reduction from poorman games with qualitative objectives to poorman reachability games.
Things get more interesting in poorman mean-payoff games, which are quantitative games; an infinite play π of the game is associated with a payoff c ∈ IR ≥0 , which is Player 1's reward and Player 2's cost. Accordingly, we refer to the players in a mean-payoff game as Max and Min. The payoff of π is determined according to the weights it traverses and, as in the previous games, the bids are only used to determine whose turn it is to move. The central question in these games is: Given a value c ∈ Q, what is the initial ratio that is necessary and sufficient for Max to guarantee a payoff of c? More formally, we say that c is the value with respect to a ratio r ∈ [0, 1] if for every > 0, we have (1) when Max's initial ratio is r + , he can guarantee a payoff of at least c, and (2) intuitively, Max cannot hope for more: if Max's initial ratio is r − , then Min can guarantee a payoff of at most c.
Our most technically-involved contribution is a construction of optimal strategies in poorman meanpayoff games, which depend on the initial ratio r ∈ [0, 1]. The crux of the solution is reasoning about strongly-connected games: we first reason on the bottom strongly-connected components of a game graph and extend the solution by, intuitively, playing a reachability game in the rest of the graph. Before describing our solution, let us highlight an interesting difference between Richman and poorman rules. With Richman bidding, it is shown in [5] that a strongly-connected Richman mean-payoff game has a value that does not depend on the initial ratio and only on the structure of the game. It thus seems reasonable to guess that the initial ratio would not matter with poorman bidding as well. We show, however, that this is not the case; the higher Max's initial ratio is, the higher the payoff he can guarantee. We demonstrate this phenomenon with the following simple game. Technically, each vertex in a mean-payoff game is labeled by a weight. Consider an infinite play π. The energy of a prefix π n of length n of π, denoted E(π n ), is the sum of the weights it traverses. The payoff of π is lim inf n→∞ E(π n )/n. Example 1. Consider the mean-payoff bidding game that is depicted in Figure 1 , where for convenience the weights are placed on the edges rather than the vertices. We take the viewpoint of Min in this example. We consider the case of r = 1 2 , and claim that the value with respect to r = 1 2 is 0. Note that the players' choices upon winning a bid in the game are obvious, and the difficulty in devising a strategy is finding the right bids. Intuitively, Min copies Max's strategy. Suppose, for example, that Min starts with a budget of 1 + and Max starts with 1, for some > 0. A strategy for Min that ensures a payoff of 0 is based on a stack of numbers as follows: In round i, if the stack is empty Min bids · 2 −i , and otherwise the first number of the stack. If Min wins, he removes the first number on the stack (if non-empty). If Max wins, Min pushes Max's winning bid on the stack. For example, suppose Max's bid in the first bidding is 0.2, he wins and Min pushes 0.2 on the empty stack. Suppose Max bids 0.3 in the second bidding, then he wins again since Min's bid is 0.2. Suppose Max bids 0.1 in the third bidding, then Min wins with his bid of 0.3 and pops it from the stack. In the next bidding his bid is 0.2. It is not hard to show that Min never bids higher than the available budget. Also, we can show that every Max win is eventually matched, thus Min's queue empties infinitely often and the energy hits 0 infinitely often. Since we use lim inf in the definition of the payoff, Min guarantees a non-positive payoff. Showing that Max can guarantee a non-negative payoff with an initial ratio of 1 2 + is harder, and a proof for the general case can be found in Section 4. We show that the value c decreases with Max's initial ratio r. We set r = 
Figure 2: A second mean-payoff game.
that Min's initial budget is 2 + and Max's initial budget is 1. We claim that Min can guarantee a payoff of −1/3. His strategy is similar to the one above, only that whenever Max wins with b, Min pushes b to the stack twice. Now, every Max win is matched by two Min wins, and the claim follows.
In order to solve strongly-connected poorman mean-payoff games, we identify a probabilistic connection for these games. Consider such a game G and a ratio r ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that RTB r (G) is a random turn-based game in which Max chooses the next move with probability r and Min with probability 1 − r. The game RTB r (G) is a stochastic mean-payoff game, and its value, denoted MP(RTB r (G)), is the optimal expected payoff that the players can guarantee. The probabilistic connection we show is that the value in G with respect to r equals the value MP(RTB r (G)).
To the best of our knowledge, there was no natural known connection between bidding games and biased random turn-based games, i.e., r = 0.5. Uniform random turn-based games, i.e., with r = 0.5, have been extensively studied in the mathematics community. In the seminal work [31] , a class of such games called tug of war games have been used to show the existence of the infinity Laplacian on a large class of sets. The infinity-laplacian problem is in turn connected to a discrete version of Dirichlet's problem. In Dirichlet's problem one gets a set S and the value of a function f of a subset of S and the goal is to find a continuous extension of f to S. The infinity Laplacian is similar only that a different local rule on the function is used rather than continuity.
Reachability games tend to be simpler than mean-payoff games, thus we find the existence of a probabilistic connection in poorman mean-payoff games surprising given the inexistence of such a connection for poorman reachability games. A corollary of the result is the following connection between poorman and Richman bidding. It is shown in [5] that the value of a Richman mean-payoff strongly-connected game G equals the value of the uniform game RTB 0.5 (G). Thus, the value of G when viewed as a Richman game equals the value of G when viewed as a poorman game with respect to the initial ratio 0.5. We are not aware of previous such connections between the two bidding rules.
Finally, we address, for the first time, complexity issues in poorman games; namely, we study the problem of finding threshold ratios in poorman games. We show that for qualitative games, the corresponding decision problem is in PSPACE using the existential theory of the reals [11] . For mean-payoff games, the problem of finding the value of the game with respect to a given ratio is also in PSPACE for general games, and for strongly-connected games, we show the value can be found in NP and coNP, and even in P for strongly-connected games with out-degree 2.
Further related work Beyond the works that are directly relevant to us, which we have compared to above, we list previous work on Richman games. To the best of our knowledge, since their introduction, poorman games have not been studied. Motivated by recreational games, e.g., bidding chess [8, 25] , discrete bidding games are studied in [17] , where the money is divided into chips, so a bid cannot be arbitrarily small unlike the bidding games we study. Non-zero-sum two-player Richman games were recently studied in [22] .
Preliminaries
A graph game is played on a directed graph G = V, E , where V is a finite set of vertices and E ⊆ V ×V is a set of edges. The neighbors of a vertex v ∈ V , denoted N (v), is the set of vertices {u ∈ V : v, u ∈ E}, and we say that G has out-degree 2 if for every v ∈ V , we have |N (v)| = 2. A path in G is a finite or infinite sequence of vertices v 1 , v 2 , . . . such that for every i ≥ 1, we have v i , v i+1 ∈ E.
Objectives An objective O is a set of infinite paths. In reachability games, Player 1 has a target vertex v R and an infinite path is winning for him if it visits v R . In parity games each vertex has a parity index in {1, . . . , d}, and an infinite path is winning for Player 1 iff the maximal parity index that is visited infinitely often is odd. We also consider games that are played on a weighted graph V, E, w , where w : V → Q. Consider an infinite path π = v 1 , v 2 , . . .. For n ∈ IN, we use π n to denote the prefix of length n of π. We call the sum of weights that π n traverses the energy of the game, denoted E(π n ). Thus, E(π n ) = 1≤j<n w(v j ). In energy games, the goal of Player 1 is to keep the energy level positive, thus he wins an infinite path iff for every n ∈ IN, we have E(π n ) > 0. Unlike the previous objectives, a path in a mean-payoff game is associated with a payoff, which is Player 1's reward and Player 2's cost. Accordingly, in mean-payoff games, we refer to Player 1 as Min and Player 2 as Max. We define the payoff of π to be lim inf n→∞ 1 n E(π n ). We say that Max wins an infinite path of a mean-payoff game if the payoff is non-negative.
Strategies and plays A strategy prescribes to a player which action to take in a game, given a finite history of the game, where we define these two notions below. For example, in turn-based games, a strategy takes as input, the sequence of vertices that were visited so far, and it outputs the next vertex to move to. In bidding games, histories and strategies are more complicated as they maintain the information about the bids and winners of the bids. Formally, a history is a sequence
where, for j ≥ 1, in the j-th round, the token is placed on vertex v j−1 , the winning bid is b j , and the winner is Player j , and Player j moves the token to vertex v j . A strategy prescribes an action b, v , where b is a bid that does not exceed the available budget and v is a vertex to move to upon winning. The winner of the bidding is the player who bids higher, where we assume there is some mechanism to resolve draws, and our results are not affected by what the mechanism is. More formally, for i ∈ {1, 2}, let B i be the initial budgets of Player i, and, for a finite history π, let W i (π) be the sum of Player i winning bids throughout π. In Richman bidding, the winner of a bidding pays the loser, thus Player 1's budget following π is B 1 − W 1 + W 2 . In poorman bidding, the winner pays the "bank", thus Player 1's budget following π is B 1 − W 1 . Note that in poorman bidding, the loser's budget does not change following a bidding. An initial vertex together with two strategies for the players determine a unique infinite play π for the game. The vertices that π visits form an infinite path path(π). Player 1 wins π according to an objective O iff path(π) ∈ O. We call a strategy f winning for Player 1 if for every strategy g of Player 2 the play they determine satisfies O. Winning strategies for Player 2 are defined dually.
Definition 2. (Initial ratio)
Suppose the initial budget of Player i is B i , for i ∈ {1, 2}, then the total initial budget is B = B 1 + B 2 and Player i's initial ratio is B i /B. We assume B > 0.
The first question that arrises in the context of bidding games asks what is the necessary and sufficient initial ratio to guarantee an objective. We generalize the definition in [26, 27] : Recall that we say that Max wins a mean-payoff game G = V, E, w if the mean-payoff value is nonnegative. Finding Th(v) for a vertex v in G thus answers the question of what is the minimal ratio of the initial budget that guarantees winning. A more refined question asks what is the optimal payoff Max can guarantee with an initial ratio r. Formally, for a constant c ∈ Q, let G c be the mean-payoff game that is obtained from G by decreasing all weights by c. Random turn-based games In a stochastic game the vertices of the graph are partitioned between two players and a nature player. As in turn-based games, whenever the game reaches a vertex of Player i, for i = 1, 2, he choses how the game proceeds, and whenever the game reaches a vertex v that is controlled by nature, the next vertex is chosen according to a probability distribution that depends only on v.
Consider a game G = V, E . The random-turn based game with ratio r ∈ [0, 1] that is associated with G is a stochastic game that intuitively simulates the fact that Player 1 chooses the next move with probability r and Player 2 chooses with probability 1 − r. Formally, we define RTB r (G) = V 1 , V 2 , V N , E, Pr, w , where each vertex in V is split into three vertices, each controlled by a different player, thus for α ∈ {1, 2, N }, we have V α = {v α : v ∈ V }, nature vertices simulate the fact that Player 1 chooses the next move with probability r, thus
, and reaching a vertex that is controlled by one of the two players means that he chooses the next move, thus E = { v α , u N : v, u ∈ E and α ∈ {1, 2}}. When G is weighted, then the weights of v 1 , v 2 , and v N equal that of v.
Fixing two strategies f and g for the two players in a stochastic game results in a Markov chain, which in turn gives rise to a probability distribution D(f, g) over infinite sequences of vertices. A strategy f is optimal w.r.t. an objective
. For the objectives we consider, it is well-known that optimal strategies exist, which are, in fact, positional; namely, strategies that only depend on the current position of the game and not on its history.
For a qualitative game G, the value of RTB r (G), denoted val(RTB r (G)), is the probability that Player 1 wins when he plays optimally. For a mean-payoff game G, the mean-payoff value of RTB r (G), denoted MP(RTB r (G)), is the maximal expected payoff Max obtains when he plays optimally.
Poorman Parity Games
For qualitative objectives, poorman games have mostly similar properties to the corresponding Richman games. We start with reachability objectives, which were studied in [27, 26] . The objective they study is slightly different than ours. We call their objective double-reachability: both players have targets and the game ends once one of the targets is reached. As we show below, for our purposes, the variants are equivalent since there are no draws in finite-state poorman and Richman double-reachability games.
Consider a double-reachability game G = V, E, u 1 , u 2 , where, for i = 1, 2, the target of Player i is u i . In both Richman and poorman bidding, trivially Player 1 wins in u 1 with any initial budget and Player 2 wins in u 2 with any initial budget, thus Th(u 1 ) = 0 and Th(u 2 ) = 1.
Theorem 6. [27, 26] Threshold ratios exist in Richman and poorman reachability games. Moreover, consider a double-reachability game G = V, E, u 1 , u 2 .
• In Richman bidding, for v ∈ V \ {u 1 , u 2 }, we have Th(v) = 1 2 Th(v + ) + Th(v − ) , and it follows that Th(v) = val(RTB 0.5 (G, v)) and that Th(v) is a rational number.
• In poorman bidding, for v ∈ V \ {u 1 , u 2 }, we have
There is a game G and a vertex v with an irrational Th(v).
Proof. The proof here is similar to [26] and is included for completeness, with a slight difference: unlike [26] , we consider games in which one of the targets is not reachable. The Richman case is irrelevant for us and we leave it out. Consider a poorman double-reachability game G = V, E, u 1 , u 2 . It is shown in [26] that there exists a unique function f : V → [0, 1] that satisfies the following conditions: we have f (u 1 ) = 0 and f (u 2 ) = 1, and for every v ∈ V , we have f (v) =
, where v + , v − ∈ N (v) are the neighbors of v that respectively maximize and minimize f , i.e., for every v ∈ N (v), we have
We claim that for every v ∈ V , we have Th(v) = f (v). Our argument will be for Player 1 and duality gives an argument for Player 2. Suppose Player 1's budget is f (v) + and Player 2's budget is 1 − f (v), for some > 0. Note that we implicitly assume that f (v) < 1. In case f (v) = 1 we do not show anything, but still, our dual strategy for Player 2 ensures that u 2 is visited, when the initial budget for Player 2 is positive. We describe a Player 1 strategy that forces the game to u 1 .
Similar to [26] , we divide Player 1's budget ratio into his real budget and a slush fund. We will ensure the following invariants:
1. Whenever we are in state v, if x is Player 1's real budget and y is Player 2's budget, then f (v) = x/(x + y).
2. Every time Player 2 wins a bidding the slush fund increases by a constant factor. Formally, there exists a constant c > 1, such that when 0 is the initial slush fund and i is the slush fund after Player 2 wins for the i-th time, we have that i > c · i−1 , for all i ≥ 1.
Note that these invariants are satisfied initially. We describe a Player 1 strategy. Consider a round in vertex v in which Player 1's real budget is x , Player 2's budget is y and the last time Player 2 won (or initially, in case Player 2 has not won yet) his slush fund was . Player 1's bid is ∆(v) · x + δ v · , where we define ∆(v) and δ v below. Upon winning, Player 1 moves to v − , i.e., to the neighbor that minimizes f (v), or, when f (v) = 0, he moves to a vertex closer to u 1 . Upon winning, Player 1 pays ∆(v) · x from his real budget and δ v · from his slush fund.
For
and otherwise, let ∆(v) = 0. In App. A we choose δ v , for v ∈ V , and show that our choice implies that Player 1's strategy maintains the invariant above. Note that the second invariant indicates that Player 2 cannot win more than a finite number of times, since whenever he wins, the slush fund increases by a constant and the slush fund cannot exceed 1, because then it would be bigger than the total budget. This in turn shows that eventually Player 1 wins n times in a row, which ensures that the play reaches u 1 .
We show existence of threshold budgets in a poorman reachability game G = V, E, u 1 . Let S ⊆ V be the set of vertices that have no path to u 1 . Clearly, for v ∈ S, we have Th(v) = 1. Let G = V , E , u 1 , u 2 be the double-reachability game that is obtained from G by setting V = V \ S and Player 2's target u 2 to be a vertex in S. For v ∈ V , we claim that Th(v) in G equals Th(v) in G. Indeed, if Player 1's ratio exceeds Th(v) he can draw the game to u 1 and if Player 2's ratio exceeds 1 − Th(v) he can draw the game to S.
Finally, we describe a poorman double-reachability game G with irrational threshold budgets. The vertices are u 1 , v 1 , v 2 , and u 2 , and the edges are u 1 ← v 1 ↔ v 2 → u 2 . Solving the equation above we get Th(v 1 ) = (
We continue to study poorman games with richer objectives.
Theorem 7. Poorman parity games are linearly reducible to poorman reachability games. Specifically, threshold ratios exist in poorman parity games.
Proof. The crux of the proof is to show that in a bottom strongly-connected component (BSCC, for short) of G, one of the players wins with every initial budget. Thus, the threshold ratios for vertices in BSCCs are either 0 or 1. For the rest of the vertices, we construct a reachability game in which a player's goal is to reach a BSCC that is "winning" for him. Formally, consider a strongly-connected poorman parity game G = V, E, p . We claim that there is α ∈ {0, 1} such that for every v ∈ V , we have Th(v) = α, i.e., when α = 0, Player 1 wins with any positive initial budget, and similarly for α = 1. Moreover, deciding which is the case is easy: let v M ax ∈ V be the vertex with maximal parity index, then α = 0 iff p(v M ax ) is odd.
Suppose
We turn to show the reduction from poorman parity games to poorman double-reachability games. Consider a poorman parity game G = V, E, p . Let S ⊆ V be a BSCC in G. We call
Poorman Mean-Payoff Games
This section consists of our most technically challenging contribution. We construct optimal strategies for the players in poorman mean-payoff games. The crux of the solution regards strongly-connected meanpayoff games, which we develop in the first three sub-sections.
Consider a strongly-connected game G and an initial ratio r ∈ [0, 1]. We claim that the value in G w.r.t. r does not depend on the initial vertex. For a vertex v in G, recall that MP r (G, v) is the maximal payoff Max can guarantee when his initial ratio in v is r + , for every > 0. We claim that for every vertex u = v in G, we have MP r (G, u) = MP r (G, v). Indeed, as in Theorem 7, Max can play as if his initial ratio is /2 and draw the game from u to v, and from there play using an initial ratio of r + /2. Since the energy that is accumulated until reaching v is constant, it does not affect the payoff of the infinite play starting from v.
We write MP r (G) to denote the value of G w.r.t. r. We show the following probabilistic connection: the value MP r (G) equals the value MP(RTB r (G)) of the random turn-based mean-payoff game RTB r (G) in which Max chooses the next move with probability r and Min with probability 1 − r.
Warm up: solving a simple game
In this section we solve a simple game through which we demonstrate the ideas of the general case. Recall that in an energy game, Min wins a finite play if the sum of weights it traverses, a.k.a. the energy, is 0 and Max wins an infinite play in which the energy stays positive throughout the play. Consider the game depicted in Fig. 1 and view the game as an energy game. It is shown in [26] that if the initial energy is k ∈ IN, then Max wins iff his initial ratio exceeds k+2 2k+2 . We describe an alternative proof for the first implication. We need several definitions. For k ∈ IN, let S k be the square of area k 2 . In Fig. 3 , we depict S 5 . We split S k into unit-area boxes such that each of its sides contains k boxes. A diagonal in S k splits it into a smaller black triangle and a larger white one. For k ∈ IN, we respectively denote by t k and T k the areas of the smaller black triangle and the larger white triangle of S k . For example, we have t 5 = 10 and T 5 = 15, and in general t k = Suppose the game starts with energy κ ∈ IN. We show that Max wins when his ratio exceeds κ+2 2κ+2 , which equals T κ+1 (κ+1) 2 . For ease of presentation, it is convenient to assume that the players' ratios add up to 1 + 0 , Max's initial ratio is T κ+1 (κ+1) 2 + 0 , and Min's initial ratio is t κ+1 (κ+1) 2 . For j ≥ 0, we think of j as Max's slush fund in the j-th round of the game, though its role here is somewhat less significant than in Theorem 6. Consider a play π. We think of changes in energy throughout π and changes in budget ratio as representing two walks on two sequences. The energy sequence is IN and the budget sequence is {t k /S k : k ∈ IN}, with the natural order in the two sets. We show a strategy for Max that maintains the invariant that whenever the energy is k ∈ IN, then Max's ratio is greater than T k+1 /(k + 1) 2 . That is, whenever Max wins a bidding, both sequences take a "step up" and when he loses, both sequences take a "step down".
We describe Max's strategy. Upon winning a bidding, Max chooses the +1 edge and we assume Min chooses the −1 edge. The challenge is to find the right bids. Suppose the energy level is k at the j-th round. Thus, Max and Min's ratio are respectively T k+1 /(k + 1) 2 + j and t k+1 /(k + 1) 2 . In other words, Min owns t k+1 boxes and Max owns a bit more than T k+1 boxes. Max's bid consists of two parts. Max bids 1/(k + 1) 2 + j /2, or in other words, a single box and half of his slush fund. We first show how the strategy maintains the invariant and then how it guarantees that an energy of 0 is never reached. Suppose first that Max wins the bidding. The total number of boxes decreases by one to (k + 1) 2 − 1, his slush fund is cut by half, and Min's budget is unchanged. Thus, Max's ratio of the budget is more than (T k+1 −1)/ (k+1) 2 −1 , which equals T k+2 /(k + 2) 2 . In other words, after normalization, Max owns more than T k+2 boxes and Min owns t k+2 boxes; the budget sequence takes a step up, matching the increase of 1 in the energy. The other case is when Min wins the bidding, the energy decreases by 1, and we show that the budget sequences takes a step down. Since Max bids more than one box, Min overbids, and in the worst case, he bids 1 box. Max's new ratio is more than T k+1 /((k + 1) 2 − 1) = T k /k 2 . For example, let k = 4. Following a Max win, Max's ratio is We conclude by showing that the energy never reaches 0 by showing that the walk on the budget sequence never reaches the first element. Suppose the energy is k = 1 in the j-th round, thus according to the invariant, Max's ratio is 
Defining a richer budget sequence
The game studied in the previous section is very simple. In this section we generalize the budget sequence that is used there so that we can handle arbitrary strongly-connected graphs. We proceed in two steps. Note that the budget sequence that is used in the previous section tends to 0.5 as the initial energy increases. It can thus be used for an initial ratio r = 0.5. The first generalization allows us to deal with r = 0.5. Recall the geometric intuition in the previous section. For some k ∈ IN, Min owns the smaller black triangle t k and Max's owns the larger white triangle T k . The total area of the square is t k + T k . Let µ, ν ∈ Q >0 . We generalize the sequence by setting Min's budget to be µ black triangles and Max's budget to be ν white triangles. The total budget, or area, is thus µ · t k + ν · T k and Max's initial ratio is r = ν·T k ν·T k +µ·t k . For example, set k = 5, µ = 2, and ν = 3. Then, Min has 2 · t 5 = 2 · 10 boxes and Max has 3 · T 5 = 3 · 15 boxes. It is nice to note the following property, which can of course be generalized: a Min win with a bid of 2 results in a step down, indeed
, and a Max win with a bid of 3 results in a step up, indeed
We make a second generalization. Rather than restricting to a discrete domain in which k gets values in IN, we replace k with a variable x whose domain is the real numbers. We define a function R r : IR → IR by R r (x) = ν·Tx µ·tx+ν·Tx . Note that lim x→∞ R r (x) = ν µ+ν , and that the limit is reached from above. We describe the intuition of how the following lemma is used. A play is going to induce a walk on a budget sequence B ⊆ IR. Max's strategy will ensure that whenever the walk reaches x ∈ B, Max's ratio is greater than R r (x). In the first part of the lemma Min bids µ · y, wins the bidding, and the walk proceeds down y steps. In the second part, Max bids ν · y, wins the bidding, and the walk proceeds up y steps. The proof can be found in App. B.
Lemma 8. Consider µ, ν ∈ Q >0 and 0 < y ≤ 1 such that µ > ν · y when ν > µ and ν > µ · y when µ > ν. Then, for every x ≥ 1 both of the following hold
The potential and strength of vertices
In an arbitrary strongly-connected game the bids in the different vertices cannot be the same. In this section we develop a technique to determine the "importance" of a node v, which we call its strength and measures how high the bid should be in v compared with the other nodes.
Consider a strongly-connected game G = V, E, w and r ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that RTB r (G) is a randomturn based game in which Max chooses the next move with probability r and Min with probability 1 − r. A positional strategy is a strategy that always chooses the same action (edge) in a vertex. It is well known that there exist optimal positional strategies for both players in stochastic mean-payoff games.
Consider two optimal positional strategies f and g in RTB r (G), for Min and Max, respectively. For
, is a known concept in probabilistic models and its existence is guaranteed [33] . We use the potential to define the strength of v, denoted St r (v), which intuitively measures how much the potentials of the neighbors of v differ. We assume w.l.o.g. that MP(RTB r (G)) = 0 as otherwise we can decrease all weights by this value. Let r = ν ν+µ . The potential and strengths of v are functions that satisfy the following:
There are optimal strategies for which Pot
, which can be found for example using the strategy iteration algorithm.
Consider a finite path π = v 1 , . . . , v n in G. We intuitively think of π as a play, where for every 1 ≤ i < n, the bid of Max in v i is St(v i ) and he moves to v We call Max wins investments and Max loses gains, where intuitively he invests in increasing the energy and gains a higher ratio of the budget whenever the energy decreases. Let G(π) and I(π) be the sum of gains and investments in π, respectively, thus G(π) = i∈L(π) St(v i ) and
Recall that the energy of π is E(π) = 1≤i<n w(v i ). The following lemma connects the strength, potential, and energy.
Lemma 9. Consider a strongly-connected game G, a ratio r = ν µ+ν ∈ (0, 1) such that MP(RTB r (G)) = 0, and a finite path π in G from v to u. Then, Pot
Proof. We prove by induction on the length of π. For n = 1, the claim is trivial since both sides of the equation are 0. Suppose the claim is true for paths of length n and we prove for paths of length n + 1. We distinguish between two cases. In the first case, Max wins in v, thus the second vertex in π is v + . The case where Min wins is proven similarly. Let π be the prefix of π starting from v + . Note that since Max wins the first bidding, we have G(π) = G(π ) and I(π) = St(v) + I(π ). Also, we have E(π) = E(π ) + w(v).
Combining these, we have E(π) +
By the induction hypothesis, we have Pot
Combining these with the definition of St(v), we have the following.
Example 10. Consider the game depicted in Fig. 2 . Max always proceeds left and Min always proceeds right, so, for example, we have v 
Putting it all together
In this section we combine the ingredients developed in the previous sections to solve arbitrary stronglyconnected mean-payoff games.
Theorem 11. Consider a strongly-connected poorman mean-payoff game G and a ratio r ∈ [0, 1]. The value of G with respect to r equals the value of the random-turn based mean-payoff game RTB r (G) in which Max chooses the next move with probability r, thus MP r (G) = MP(RTB r (G)).
Proof. We assume w.l.o.g. that MP(RTB r (G)) = 0 since otherwise we decrease this value from all weights. Also, the case where r ∈ {0, 1} is easy since RTB r (G) is a graph and in G, one of the players can win all biddings. Thus, we assume r ∈ (0, 1). Recall that MP(π) = lim inf n→∞ E(π n ) n . We show a Max strategy that, when the game starts from a vertex v ∈ V and with an initial ratio of r + , guarantees that the energy is bounded below by a constant, which implies MP(π) ≥ 0.
Note that showing such a strategy for Max suffices to prove MP r (G) = 0 since our definition for a payoff favors Min. Consider the game G that is obtained from G by multiplying all weights by −1. We have MP(RTB r (G )) = −MP(RTB r (G)) = 0. Associate Min in G with Max in G , thus an initial ratio of r − for Min in G is associated with an initial ratio of r + of Max in G . Let f be a Max strategy in G that guarantees a non-negative payoff. Suppose Min plays in G according to f and let π be a play when Max plays some strategy. Since f guarantees a non-negative payoff in G , we have lim sup n→∞ E(π n )/n ≤ 0 in G, and in particular MP(π) = lim inf n→∞ E(π n )/n ≤ 0.
Before we describe Max's strategy, we need several definitions. Let S = max v∈V |St(v)| and r = ν ν+µ . We choose 0 < β ≤ 1 such that β · ν · S < 1 and β · µ · ν · S < µ ν . Let B = {β · i : i ∈ IN}. We choose x 0 ∈ B such that Max's ratio is greater than R r (x 0 ), which is possible since R r tends to 1 − r from above.
Suppose Max is playing according to the strategy we describe below and Min is playing according to some strategy. The play induces a walk on B, which we refer to as the budget walk. Max's strategy guarantees the following: Invariant: Whenever the budget walk reaches an x ∈ B, then Max's ratio is greater than R r (x).
The walk starts in x 0 and the invariant holds initially due to our choice of x 0 . Suppose the token is placed on the vertex v ∈ V and the walk reaches
is the denominator of R r (x), and he moves to v + upon winning. If Max loses, the walk proceeds down to x − ν · St(v) · β, and by Lemma 8, the invariant is maintained. If Max wins, the walk proceeds up to x + µ · St(v) · β, and by the other part of Lemma 8, and the invariant is maintained. Claim: For every Min strategy, the budget walk never reaches x = 1.
Recall that S is the maximal strength of a vertex. The largest step down on the budget sequence following a Min win is at most β ·S ·ν. Thus, before crossing 1, the walk must visit 1+k·β, for some 1 ≤ k ≤ S ·ν +1. Suppose the walk visits x = 1 + k · β at vertex v ∈ V with St(v) · ν > k. Thus, if Min wins the bidding, the walk crosses 1. We claim that Max wins the bidding. Let z = St(v) · ν · β. Recall that Max's bid at v is µ·z D(x) and that Max's ratio is greater than R r (x), thus Min's ratio is less than 1 − R r (x) ≤
. For every 0 < z < 1, we have z >
, and our choice of β implies that indeed 0 < z < 1. Thus, Max's bid exceeds Min's budget, so he wins the bidding, and we are done. Claim: The energy throughout a play is bounded from below. Formally, there exists a constant c ∈ IR such that for every Min strategy and a finite play π, we have E(π) ≥ c.
Consider a finite play π. We view π as a sequence of vertices in G. Recall that the budget walk starts at x 0 , and that G(π) and I(π) represent sums of strength of vertices. Suppose the budget walk reaches x following the play π, then
Recall that for every v ∈ V , we have St(v) ≥ −S. Rephrasing Lemma 9, we have
. By the claim above x ≥ 1. It follows that 1−x 0 βµν − 2S ≤ E(π), and we are done.
Remark 12.
An interesting connection between poorman and Richman biddings arrises from Theorem 11. Consider a strongly-connected mean-payoff game G. For an initial ratio r ∈ [0, 1], let MP r P (G) denote the value of G with respect to r with poorman bidding. In [5] , the authors show that the value with Richman bidding does not depend on r, thus we denote it by MP R (G). Moreover, they show a probabilistic connection: MP R (G) equals the value in the RTB in which the players are selected uniformly, thus MP R (G) = MP(RTB 0.5 (G)). Our results show that poorman games with initial ratio 0.5 coincide with Richman games. Indeed, we have MP R (G) = MP 0.5 P (G). To the best of our knowledge such a connection between the two bidding rules has not been identified before.
Remark 13. The proof technique in Theorem 11 extends to poorman energy games. Consider a stronglyconnected mean-payoff game G, and let r ∈ [0, 1] such that MP r (G) = 0. Now, view G as a poorman energy game. The proof of Theorem 11 shows that when Max's initial ratio is r + , there exists an initial energy level from which he can win the game. On the other hand, when Max's initial ratio is r − , Min can win the energy game from every initial energy. Indeed, consider the game G that is obtained from G by multiplying all weights by −1. Again, using Theorem 11 and associating Min with Max, Min can keep the energy level bounded from above, which allows him, similar to the qualitative case, to play a strategy in which he either wins or increases his ratio by a constant. Eventually, his ratio is high enough to win arbitrarily many times in a row and drop the energy as low as required.
Extention to general mean-payoff games
We extend the solution in the previous sections to general graphs in a similar manner to the qualitative case; we first reason about the BSCCs of the graph and then construct an appropriate reachability game on the rest of the vertices. Recall that, for a vertex v in a mean-payoff game, the ratio Th(v) is a necessary and sufficient initial ratio to guarantee a payoff of 0.
Consider a poorman mean-payoff game G = V, E, w . Recall that, for v ∈ V , Th(v) is the necessary and sufficient initial ratio for Max to guarantee a non-positive payoff. Let S 1 , . . . , S k ⊆ V be the BSCCs of G and S = 1≤i≤k S i . For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the poorman mean-payoff game G i = S i , E |S i , w |S i is a strongly-connected game. We define r i ∈ [0, 1] as follows. If there is an r ∈ [0, 1] such that MP r (G i ) = 0, then r i = r. Otherwise, if for every r, we have MP r (G i ) > 0, then r i = 0, and if for every r, we have MP r (G i ) < 0, then r i = 1. By Theorem 11, for every v ∈ S i , we have Th(v) = r i . We construct a generalized reachability game G that corresponds to G by replacing every S i in G with a vertex u i . Player 1 wins a path in G iff it visits some u i and when it visits u i , Player 1's ratio is at least r i . It is not hard to generalize the proof of Theorem 6 to generalized reachability poorman games and obtain the following. Theorem 14. The threshold ratios in a poorman mean-payoff game G coincide with the threshold ratios in the generalized reachability game that corresponds to G.
Computational Complexity
We study the complexity of finding the threshold ratios in poorman games. We formalize this search problem as the following decision problem. Recall that threshold ratios in poorman reachability games may be irrational (see Theorem 6).
THRESH-BUD Given a bidding game G, a vertex v, and a ratio r ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q, decide whether Th(v) ≥ r.
Theorem 15. For poorman parity games, THRESH-BUD is in PSPACE.
Proof. To show membership in PSPACE, we guess the optimal moves for the two players. To verify the guess, we construct a program of the existential theory of the reals that uses the relation between the threshold ratios that is described in Theorem 6. Deciding whether such a program has a solution is known to be in PSPACE [11] . Formally, given a poorman parity game G = V, E, p and a vertex v ∈ V , we guess, for each vertex u ∈ V , two neighbors u + , u − ∈ N (u). We construct the following program. For every vertex u ∈ V , we introduce a variable x u , and we add constraints so that a satisfying assignment to x u coincides with the threshold ratio in u. Consider a BSCC S of G. Recall that the threshold ratios in S are all either 0 or 1, and verifying which is the case can be done in linear time. Suppose the threshold ratios are α ∈ {0, 1}. We add constraints x u = α, for every u ∈ S. For every vertex u ∈ V that is not in a BSCC, we have constraints x u = x u + 1−x u − +x u + and x u − ≤ x u ≤ x u + , for every u ∈ N (u). By Theorems 6 and 7, a satisfying assignment assigns to x u the ratio Th(u). We conclude by adding a final constraint x v ≥ r. Clearly, the program has a satisfying assignment iff Th(v) ≥ r, and we are done.
We continue to study mean-payoff games.
Theorem 16. For poorman mean-payoff games, THRESH-BUD is in PSPACE. For strongly-connected games, it is in NP and coNP. For strongly-connected games with out-degree 2, THRESH-BUD is in P.
Proof. To show membership in PSPACE, we proceed similarly to the qualitative case, and show a nondeterministic polynomial-space that uses the existential theory of the reals to verify its guess. Given a game G, we construct a program that finds, for each BSCC S of G, the threshold ratio for all the vertices in V . We then extend the program to propagate the threshold ratios to the rest of the vertices, similar to Theorem 14. Given a strongly-connected game G and a ratio r ∈ [0, 1], we construct RTB r (G) in linear time. Then, deciding whether MP(RTB r (G)) ≥ 0, is known to be in NP and coNP.
The more challenging case is the solution for strongly-connected games with out-degree 2. Consider such a game G = V, E, w and r ∈ [0, 1]. We construct an MDP D on the structure of G such that MP(D) = MP r (G). Since finding MP(D) is known to be in P, the claim follows. When r ≥ 
Discussion
We studied for the first time infinite-duration poorman bidding games. We show the existence of threshold ratios for poorman games with qualitative objectives and give, to the best of our knowledge, the first complexity upper bounds on finding threshold ratios. For poorman mean-payoff games, we construct optimal strategies with respect to the initial ratio of the budgets and show an interesting probabilistic connection for these games.
Historically, poorman bidding has been studied less than Richman bidding, but the reason was technical difficulty, not lack of motivation. On the contrary, we believe that poorman bidding is as motivated as Richman bidding, if not more so, particularly since they are easier to generalize. Poorman bidding has been less approachable since, e.g., poorman reachability games do not necessarily have rational threshold ratios. We expect that the structure we find here, namely the probabilistic connection for poorman bidding, will make these game more approachable and assist in introducing concepts like multiple-players, recharging stations, and partial information to bidding games, which are hard to add to Richman bidding.
This work belongs to a line of works that transfer concepts and ideas between the areas of formal verification and algorithmic game theory [30] , two fields with a different take on game theory and with complementary needs. For example, formal reasoning about multi-agent safety critical systems, e.g., components of an autonomous car, requires insights on rationality. On the other side, formally verifying the correctness of auctions or reasoning about ongoing auctions, are both challenges that can benefit from the experience of the formal methods community. Examples of works in the intersection of the two fields include logics for specifying multi-agent systems [2, 14, 29] , studies of equilibria in games related to synthesis and repair problems [13, 12, 19, 1] , non-zero-sum games in formal verification [15, 9] , and applying concepts from formal methods to resource allocation games such as rich specifications [7] , efficient reasoning about very large games [4, 24] , and a dynamic selection of resources [6] .
A Proof of Theorem 6
Let ∆ min be the smallest positive number such that f (v) = ∆ min for some v, and ∆ min = 1 if f (v) = 0 for all v ∈ V . Let δ 1 be 1 and δ i be such that i−1 j=1 δ j < ∆ min /2δ i , for all i ∈ {2, . . . , |V |}. Also, let γ be such that |V | j=1 δ j < 1/γ. For each state v (such that f (v) > 0), consider that Player 1 wins all bids and let dist(v) be the number of bids before the play ends up in u 1 starting from v. When f (v) = 0, let dist(v) be the length of the shortest path from v to u 1 . Then, δ v = γδ i , for i = |V | − dist(v).
In case Player 1 wins, his real budget becomes x − ∆(v)x , and Player 2's budget stays y . In that case, Player 1's new real budget ratio becomes 
B Proof of Lemma 8
Recall that t = . We will use that they are strictly increasing in , t 1 = 0 and T 1 = 1. We will first argue that µ · t x − µ · y µ · t x + ν · T x − µ · y ≤ µ · t x−y µ · t x−y + ν · T x−y .
Before doing so we will show that the denominators in the inequality are positive, i.e. that µ · t x + ν · T x − µ · y > 0 and that µ · t x−y + ν · T x−y > 0. We have that
using that T and t are increasing, x ≥ 1, t 1 = 0 and T 1 = 1 and ν > µ · y, even if µ > ν. Also, µ · t x−y + ν · T x−y = µ · (x − y)(x − y − 1) 2 + ν · (x − y)(x − y + 1) 2 = (µ + ν) · (x − y)(x − y + 1) 2 − (x − y)µ
We consider two cases, µ = ν and µ = ν. In the former case, if µ = ν, then 2µ · (x − y)(x − y + 1) 2 − (x − y)µ = µ(x − y)(x − y + 1) − (x − y)µ > 0 , using that x > y and µ > 0. Otherwise, consider that µ = ν.
